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Judging Unions’ Future Using a Historical Perspective: The Public Policy 
Choice Between Competition and Unionization 
 
Michael L. Wachter• 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
The prospects for private sector unionism, in the context of the prolonged decline 
in membership since the early 1950s, have long captivated labor economists, and 
deservedly so.   Today, private sector union membership is less than 10 percent of private 
sector employment, far below its peak of 36 percent in the early 1950s.1  In the 
construction industry, a stronghold of private sector unions, union employment share is 
down from over 80 percent to approximately 20 percent.2  This unrelenting decline 
represents one of the most important institutional changes affecting the United States 
economy.   
 
In this paper I address the future of private sector unions in a broad historical and 
institutional context.  In doing so I make extensive use of a recently published collection 
of papers on the topic, “The Future of Private Sector Unionism in the United States,” 
edited by James Bennett and Bruce Kaufman, which also adopted a broad focus in 
exploring the future of unions.3     
 
The positions I develop are the following.  First, although numerous issues have 
been cited for the decline in unions over the past three decades, in the end they all come 
down to a single question: the ability of unions to achieve their traditional goals in the 
economic environment they confront.  I consider the primary goal of unions to be taking 
wages and working conditions out of competition, although in so defining the goal I am 
forcing a complex set of goals into a single statement.4  This, in turn, amounts to taking 
advantage of opportunities for obtaining economic rents or removing exploitative or 
monopsonistic elements from firms.  Consequently, it is the continuing trend toward a 
more competitive United States economy that represents the critical economic factor in 
the multi-decade decline in unions.  
 
Second, to predict the future of unions, understanding their rapid rise to 
prominence between the 1930s and the early 1950s is at least as important as explaining 
their multi-decade decline.  More specifically, to predict the near-term future the recent 
past is sufficient, but to understand what factors might be needed for a major resurgence 
in unionization, it is necessary to go back to the earlier period of rapid union growth.  
What factors were in place at that time?  I argue that the high-water mark of unionization, 
rather than reflecting inevitable economy-wide forces, was itself highly dependent on the 
convergence of historical events that promoted unions.  These include the anti-
competition policies adopted during the Great Depression and the prevailing view that 
unions improved the efficiency and functioning of labor markets, making them less 
exploitative.  By the time union employment reached its peak, however, the economy, 
including the labor market, was becoming more competitive, and the adoption of human 
resource management policies by nonunion firms was seen as successful in removing 
exploitative elements from the workplace of individual firms.   
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This view of unions is supported by the nature of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) and particularly by the collective bargaining apparatus that it created and 
supports.  The collective bargaining apparatus, although ideally suited for protecting rents 
or attacking monopsonistic forces, is not well suited for a highly cooperative employment 
relationship.  Contracts are a high cost method for organizing the employment 
relationship inside firms.  Where the firm and its employees can cooperate using norms--
or non-legally enforceable rules and standards--they can operate more efficiently than can 
a firm where the employment relationship uses the more costly and less flexible contract 
mechanism.   
 
The paper is organized along the following lines.  In the first section I evaluate the 
evidence for the causes of the decline in unionization rate.  The evidence appears 
overwhelming that if the institutional setting does not change, unions will remain less 
than 10 percent of the private sector workforce.  In Sections 2 and 3, I discuss the longer 
run historical record and develop the point that the high-water mark of unionization fits 
the convergence of specific historical events.  My discussion relies extensively on the 
accounts being written as the events were taking place.  More important than a modern 
reinterpretation of the past, we need to know what the actors, at the time, actually thought 
was happening.  In Section 4, I examine the improvements in human resource 
management and what those improvements imply for the union sector.  In Section 5, I 
examine the costliness of the NLRA collective bargaining apparatus.  The last section 
summarizes the paper and draws some conclusions.   
 
 
I. Economic Factors in the Decline in Private Sector Union Employment 
 
There is a virtually unanimous view that assuming no major changes in the 
institutional environment, union density in the private sector will remain below 10 
percent, and perhaps fall to close to 5 percent.  The major reasons for this have been 
extensively documented in the literature.5    
 
First and foremost, the American economy has become much more competitive 
over the past 50 years.  Factors include the growth of the internationally traded goods 
sector; the increase in multinationals with multi-country production loci such as 
European and Japanese car companies with plants in the United States; the efficiency of 
capital markets in providing seed capital for new ventures to enter industries that earn 
super-competitive returns; and the decline in the number of industries that are regulated 
where government rules have protected firms from competition.  The result is that few 
sectors of the economy are insulated from competition.  As a consequence, these sectors 
cannot serve as a source of reliable rents for business and labor to negotiate over.6  
 
Increased competition produces more winners than losers, but it does produce 
losers.  Among the losers are the companies and their employees with cost structures that 
are above those of competitors and potential entrants.  Losses are also suffered by 
companies and their employees who are being deregulated and who survived in the past 
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because of government protection from competition.   To the extent that a primary goal of 
unions is to take wages and working conditions out of competition, they become primary 
losers as well.   
 
Second, the overwhelming evidence supports the contention that unions do indeed 
raise wages above competitive levels.  For a time, some researchers contended that the 
increase in union wages reflects an increase in productivity, but there has never been any 
reliable evidence to support this conjecture.  The result of the wage premium is to put 
unionized firms at a competitive cost disadvantage.  All else equal, one would expect that 
the union compensation premium would decline as industries became more competitive.  
In fact, the reverse occurred, particularly over the 1970s and early 1980s.  Although the 
union wage premium has declined from historically high levels reached in the early 
1980s, the premium or percentage wage differential is still above levels existing in earlier 
decades.  In other words, while the American economy is much more competitive than 
say in the 1950s or 1960s, union wage premiums are higher today.7  
 
Third, the private-sector American economy is becoming increasingly an 
economy where job creation occurs in industries and occupations and among nonunion 
firms and among demographic groups where unionization rates have historically been 
low.  Based on the accounting methodology of Farber and Western (2002), American 
jobs are disproportionately being created in the service-producing sectors rather than the 
goods-producing sectors, and in professional and managerial occupations rather than in 
blue-collar occupations.  In addition, the American labor force is increasingly better 
educated and more mobile, whereas unions have traditionally been strongest among less-
educated and less-mobile workers. 
 
The compositional effects are partly exogenous, but each of the elements 
leverages the effects of competition and the rising union wage premium.  Although the 
growth in service sector employment is largely an exogenous factor, most service sector-
producing industries are highly competitive.  As the economy becomes more service 
oriented, it becomes more competitive at the same time.    
 
But the high wage premium also contributes to the compositional shift between 
union and nonunion firms within a given sector.  At least partly as a result of the higher 
costs, R&D expenditures and new capital investments in unionized firms lag behind 
levels in nonunion firms.  Consequently, new employment opportunities, whether 
through the construction of new establishments or the startup of new businesses, occurs 
primarily in the nonunion sector.  Since newly established firms start off as nonunion, the 
more dynamic the economy, the faster unions have to organize new plants simply to 
maintain a constant share of employment. 
 
In the union sector, one observes a slow decline in rates in industries where 
unions have been strong.  If an existing plant is unionized, it is likely to stay so, barring a 
major battle to dislodge it.  An existing plant does generate rents (i.e., revenue greater 
than variable--but not necessarily fixed--costs) over which the parties can bargain without 
the plant being closed, and the workings of labor law make it difficult for management to 
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move the capital without first bargaining over the topic and possibly taking a strike.  But 
little in the way of new employment is created in these plants and ultimately they are 
closed.   
 
Similarly, a more mobile population is itself a result of the fact that the economy 
is competitive with considerable job turnover as new firms develop and old ones lose 
market share.  Finally, a better educated population makes the supply side of the labor 
market more informed.  This makes it difficult for firms to establish monopsonistic 
niches that can rely on the ignorance of the labor force of prevailing wages, benefits, and 
working conditions.   
 
A fourth factor is that management opposition to unions' organizing efforts has 
been an important factor in explaining the difficulties unions have faced in meeting the 
requirements to hold a certification election and the lack of success in winning the 
elections that are held (Kleiner, 2002).  Here again, although management opposition 
may be somewhat of an exogenous factor, it also ties closely with the theme of the effects 
of increased competition.  In a competitive economy, higher wages and benefits and a 
loss of flexibility as a consequence of work-rule rigidities in collective bargaining 
agreement should be expected to generate management opposition.  Similarly, the claim 
that management opposition is higher today than in the past is predicted by the fact that 
the wage premium remains high and product markets are more competitive.   
 
The issue becomes more complex to the extent that management opposition 
includes an increased use of unfair labor practices.  From a purely economics perspective, 
one can attribute the growth in unfair labor practice claims against management to a 
similarly rational cost-benefit calculation on the part of management.  Still, the issue is 
highly controversial, largely because of the normative questions it poses.   
 
A final factor involves the failure of unions to organize enough workers to offset 
the job losses that normally occur in a dynamic economy.  Given the dynamic nature of 
the economy, jobs are being created and destroyed at a high rate.   With more jobs 
disappearing than being created in already unionized firms, unions must be able to 
organize large numbers of new workers simply to retain even existing levels of 
employment.  This they have been unable to do.  On a purely accounting basis there are 
too few elections, in too many small units, and the union win rate is too low.  With little 
in the works indicating a much higher level of successful union elections, the percentage 
of union employment in the private sector, on this purely accounting explanation, is 
likely to continue to decline (Farber and Western, 2002). 
 
 The above analysis focuses on economic factors and holds constant the 
underlying institutional features of the economy.  Clearly, changes in the latter are also 
important, particularly the legal rules that structure the unionization and bargaining 
processes, the historical factors such as the confluence of forces in the 1930s, and the 
mission or function of unions.     
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II. Historical and Institutional Factors—Government Policy Toward 
Competition 
 
The above section focuses on the prolonged decline in unions over the last several 
decades.  To understand whether unions are likely to see renewed growth in the future, it 
is at least as important to understand the reasons for the rise in union density from the 
1930s through the early 1950s.       
 
In a fascinating paper, Kaufman (2002) discusses the developments of the 1930s 
by going back to the AEA presidential speech given by George Barnett in 1932.  In that 
speech Barnett predicted that “unionism is likely to be a declining influence in 
determining conditions of labor.”  The reasons cited by Barnett include reasons given 
today, primarily a shift in the composition of demand toward sectors in which unions 
have been largely unsuccessful in organizing workers and a steady increase in real wages.  
Of course, Barnett’s prediction was wrong for the time, in the sense that the steep 
upswing was about to begin.  Kaufman’s punch line is that Barnett got it right, he was 
just forty years too early.   Indeed, Barnett himself would have gotten it right if he had 
only made his prediction conditional on his theory.  Barnett believed that the steady rise 
in real wages had eroded workers’ interest in unions during the 1920s, but real wages 
were already beginning their depression decline in 1932—hence he would have made a 
conditional prediction that membership would indeed begin to rise.   
 
One of the many virtues of the Kaufman paper is to encourage humility in those 
who write about the decline of unionism today—believing it to be a single event rather 
than possibly a cyclical phenomenon.  Kaufman also should remind us that hand 
wringing over the decline in unionism  is not predicated on the unions’ fall from being a 
mass movement in the 1950s.  When Barnett was wringing his hands, union density was 
at a peak of less than 20 percent of employment.   
 
Another virtue of the Kaufman article is to remind us that reading what the 
ancients actually thought in the 1930s might be useful.   With this as incentive, I returned 
to some of the older texts, including Barnett’s.  But, having done so I want to quarrel with 
Barnett on two points. 
 
First, even though Barnett's prediction ultimately was realized, it was for  
different reasons than those he outlined.  But his errors are instructive.  For example, the 
compositional shift emphasized by Barnett was the trend in employment away from craft 
workers, a group that historically had the highest rates of unionization.   Predicting future 
developments based on compositional shifts is highly informative, but only if the 
economy is not undergoing important shifts.  Barnett entirely failed to see the emerging 
unionization of industrial workers, a group that remains relatively highly unionized to 
this day.  Similarly, a compositional shift analysis would have entirely missed the 
unionization of government workers beginning in the 1960s.8  
 
More important, I believe that there is an alternative message in the historical 
data.   The alternative message is that the sharp upswing in union density from the 1930s 
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to 1953 was itself highly dependent on a number of historical events coming together.  
While Barnett and his emphasis on the real wage decline would stress the Great 
Depression and the resulting passage of the NLRA as the causal factors, I would 
emphasize less the Great Depression and more the government’s response to the Great 
Depression: namely a series of legislative measures that severely restricted competition. 
 
It was widely accepted at the time that government policy during the Great 
Depression was anchored by two formidable trends: first, protection against foreign 
competition through measures such as the Smoot-Hawley tariffs (1930), and second, 
protection against competition at home appearing under the euphemism “fair trade 
practices.”  The National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), the Robinson-Patman Act 
(1936), the Davis-Bacon Act, the Miller-Tydings Act (1937), as well as state and local 
price-maintenance laws, were some of the policies driving attempts to “stabilize 
business” through reducing competition, otherwise known as “fair trade practice.”9  
Stabilizing business through fair trade was the presumed solution to the economic ills.  
While such a policy might appear to be a pro-business policy to modern readers, this was 
very much not the case.10   
 
The fair trade policies of the 1930s were based on a particularly dark view of the 
large corporations that had been developing since the early 1900s.  It was a strongly held 
belief that these large corporations were more efficient than the existing smaller 
companies with which they competed and would win open competitive battles.11  The 
large corporations were also viewed as wielding considerable political clout arising from 
the domination of economic markets.  “Fair trade,” during this period meant attempting 
to counterbalance the existing power of large corporations. 
 
The National Labor Relations Act, in its original form, was a reflection of the 
times.  At a time when business firms were seen as having considerable power, the 
NLRA was intended to level the playing field by giving workers some offsetting power.12  
Unquestionably, the NLRA was an enormous causal factor in the spike in union density.  
However, its overall impact might have been a good deal less if it had been drafted in a 
more competitive environment.  The NLRA, as amended today and as interpreted in 
several decades of case law, is clearly a very different measure than the original Wagner 
Act.  While it is less supportive of unions, it is also much more in keeping with the more 
competitive economy promoted by today’s government policies.   
 
Unions flourished in the years between the passage of the Wagner Act and the 
subsequent amendments adopted in the Taft-Hartley Act.  Indeed, the rapid increases in 
unionization came to an end in 1948, the year that the Taft-Hartley Act was passed.  After 
1948, unionization rates only crept slightly higher, reaching a peak in 1953, before 
turning negative.  The timing of the passage of Taft-Hartley is consistent with the 
hypothesis that legal rules matter a great deal.  But my point is that legal rules have to be 
viewed in the broader policy context in which they are adopted.  It is difficult to imagine 
a return to a legal regime similar to the original Wagner Act in today’s more competitive 
environment. 
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The claim then is that it was less the Great Depression and the decline in real 
wages and more a series of legislative initiatives that reduced the degree of competition 
throughout the economy and that allowed for the upswing in unionization rates to the 
extent that occurred.  The ability of the newly established industrial unions in the 1930s 
to bargain for higher wages, while maintaining employment levels, was at least in part a 
function of the noncompetitive niches in which industrial firms operated.13 
 
If it were a depressed economy and declining real wages that encouraged 
unionization during the 1930s, one should find an increase in union density in other 
sustained periods of real wage decline.14  However, compare the change in union density 
during the 1929-1936 period with the change in union density between 1972 and 1985.  
Both periods were one of real wage change.  Although real wages fell by a greater 
amount during the Great Depression, workers recouped their losses much faster during 
the 1930s than in the later period.  Unions pursued the same policy in both periods—
attempting to maintain the real wages of their members.  In both periods they were 
successful—the substantial increase in the union premium that still exists today was 
created during the 1970s.  The question then, is why didn’t union density increase during 
the 1970s instead of continuing to decrease?  That is, why didn’t unions successfully 
organize as many nonunion workers in the late 1970s and early 1980s as during the 
1930s?   My conjecture is that whereas government policy specifically attempted and 
succeeded in restraining competition during the former period, United States policy was 
specifically pro-competitive in the latter period.    
 
The change in policy from anti-competitive to pro-competitive itself did not take 
place in isolation.  Viewing the broader historical and institutional context, another factor 
was also changing in a manner that pushed policy toward supporting a more competitive 
economic structure.  This other element was the resolution of what had been a great 
debate—at least by modern standards—between economists and political theorists who 
saw the underlying labor market as being either competitive in nature or anti-competitive 
or exploitative in nature.  This debate has been settled in the economics community for 
enough years that we easily forget its importance in the days when union density was on 
the rise.  It is to this topic that I now turn.   
 
 
III. The Great Debate on the Role of Labor Unions 
 
During the period of increasing union density, the role of unions in the economy 
was perceived differently than today.   To many commentators unions were necessary to 
correct labor market imperfections or tendencies that kept wages arbitrarily, or even 
inefficiently, low 
 
The modern idea that labor markets are highly competitive was only beginning to 
develop during this period.  It was only in 1932, the same year that Barnett was giving his 
presidential address, that a young Sir John Hicks published his then controversial The 
Theory of Wages.  Hicks’s contribution was to develop what he called the marginal 
productivity theory of wages; or what modern readers would recognize as contemporary 
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wage theory.15  Hicks recognized that wages would not always clear the labor market, but 
argued that equilibrating forces would work in that direction.16 
 
Most commentators, on the other hand, believed that because of market power, 
firms could exploit labor.  The concept of an equilibrium market-clearing wage with 
attractive efficiency principles was very much in question even among professional 
economists.  These commentators also believed that a counterbalance was needed to the 
growing economic and political power of large corporations.   
 
These companies were seen as having not only monopoly power in product 
markets, but also monopsony power in labor markets.   While few economists believe 
that labor markets are best characterized as monopsonistic rather than competitive, the 
issue was very much open to debate in the 1930s and 1940s.17  In monopsonistic labor 
markets, marker power allows firms to pay workers less than their marginal productivity.  
Unions, by raising wages through collective bargaining, push the economy toward a more 
efficient equilibrium.  Indeed, employment levels rise along with wages (Shove, reprinted 
in Hicks, 1932, p. 258).  Consequently, if one believed that labor markets were primarily 
monopsonistic, then labor unions could raise employment, while increasing wages.  
Moreover, in raising wages for its own members, unions were improving economic 
efficiency and, in that sense, improving overall economic welfare.   
 
Noted labor relations experts offered other arguments.  For example, John R. 
Commons, one of the original giants of industrial relations, argued that cutthroat 
competition among workers set the market wage at the wage that the cheapest worker 
would be willing to accept (Commons and Andrews, 1927, p. 198) and that increasing 
wages (particularly the minimum wage) could actually increase output because 
employers would insist upon it (p. 223).  Any number of other theories could be cited. As 
long as corporations were seen as having enormous economic and political clout, there 
was little of today’s faith that labor markets generated efficient outcomes.  As with 
monopsony, labor unions played an important productive role in these theories as well—
improving the workings of the labor market. 
 
These institutional theories took a holistic approach to labor markets that were 
appealing on one level, but highly confused on another.  One reason Commons had a 
glum picture of wages falling to the level of the cheapest worker was that he assumed 
high levels of unemployment would drive wages lower.  But this is more a theory of 
business cycle dynamics than of wage setting.   In any case, as a matter of business cycle 
dynamics, wages are downwardly sticky during periods of cyclical unemployment, which 
is one reason that unemployment can persist for so long, a point well understood by 
Hicks even in 1932.  But one cannot make a positive case for a continuing institutional 
structure such as labor unions by arguing that they might play a positive role during 
recessions.18    
 
Another early and indeed continuing criticism of competitive wage theory is that 
markets can settle at an equilibrium wage that represents sweatshop conditions or other 
distributively undesirable results.  But competitive results can be distributively unfair.  
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The competitive theory point is that the unfair results cannot be improved upon in any 
Pareto sense.    
 
A final question is whether unions have distributive benefits for other labor 
market participants other than their own members.  Two types of effects have been 
recognized.  “Threat effects” might lead nonunion firms to copy the wages of union firms 
to avoid being unionized.  On the other hand, the union wage premium causes a reduction 
in employment in the union sector that creates a “spillover effect” that can lower wages 
in nonunion firms.  The evidence from this literature is mixed; however, any threat effect 
that would raise wages for nonunion members, creating a public good for nonunion 
workers, appears to be minor.  The general result from this literature is that from a 
Hicksian competitive market perspective, unions can change the distributive outcome to 
favor their own members but do not realize allocative improvements that might benefit 
workers more generally.19 
 
A more promising approach for those who continue to argue that unions have a 
beneficial role in improving labor market functioning is to shift the perspective from the 
overall market to individual firms and the potential of individual firms to be exploitative.  
This can occur even if the labor market itself is generally competitive.  Firms, particularly 
those with immigrant, unskilled, or immobile labor, could act arbitrarily to set terms and 
conditions of employment to be below market levels.  For example, Neil Chamberlain, 
another one of the great figures in industrial relations, wrote in 1959:  “unions’ chief 
contribution to their members’ welfare has been to free them from the tyranny of 
arbitrary decision or discriminatory action in the work place"  (Chamberlain 1970, 
p.140).  Where individual firms exercise exploitative power to set wages below existing 
market competitive levels, the same beneficial results emerge—unions can improve the 
functioning of labor markets.  
 
In terms of timing, the great debate over the role of unions continued from the 
early 1900s through the period of increasing union density, and it only began to lose 
influence as union density began its sustained decline.   Simons (1944) wrote the first 
major academic article arguing that unions, along with corporations, had become part of 
the problem of concentrated power.   In 1955, John R. Hicks argued that union power had 
put the United States on a “labor standard.”  The monetary authorities would either have 
to validate union-imposed wage increases by inflating the currency or would suffer the 
consequences of recession and unemployment.  More generally, as Hicks’ original ideas 
about the competitiveness of labor markets took hold, union power was no longer needed 
to improve the functioning of labor markets.20   
 
By the late 1970s, the next act played out as the government began to deregulate 
many of the sectors that had previously been regulated.  The core idea of the 1930s—that 
large firms were inherently more competitive than small ones—and would therefore need 
to be regulated—had long since lost its following.  Empirical evidence, including the 
studies noted above, verified that unions were largely having the economic effect of 
raising wages above competitive levels.  In several respects the Freeman and Medoff 
volume What Do Unions Do? (1984), is the last attempt to re-establish elements of the 
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former theory.  Although Freeman and Medoff provide much empirical evidence that has 
been substantiated over time, their argument that unions are primarily capturing 
monopoly rents or manage to increase productivity, thus offsetting the higher rates, has 
not been supported in subsequent empirical studies.21     
 
Why is the debate important?   First, it provides a picture of the public perception 
of unions during the period when union density was increasing.  Union density was 
increasing at a time when public policy arguably was based on the belief that unions not 
only increased the welfare of their own members, but improved the workings of the 
economy more generally.  That is, unions were seen as providing a public good.  Second, 
the debate influenced public policy.  Labor law matters a great deal.  As the writing of the 
neoclassical economists gained greater support, it influenced public policy toward unions, 
starting with the Taft-Hartley amendments and continuing through the attempt of the 
Dunlop Commission to propose labor law changes.  Finally, the success of the Hicks’ 
model predicted the wage premium/employment tradeoff that would emerge by the 
1950s.   
 
While the debate resolved issues involving the functioning of labor markets, it 
obviously could not resolve issues involving the potential for exploitative behavior by 
individual firms.  On this point, economists like Hicks could agree with labor relations 
institutionalists like Commons.   Competitive labor market forces are not strong enough 
to guarantee that workers will receive the market wage.  
 
IV. Human Resource Management and the Nonunion Sector 
 
As noted in the last section, even if labor markets are competitive they are not 
perfectly so.  In the employment relationship, firm-specific training creates a gap between 
the value of workers to their incumbent firm and their opportunity wage or next best 
opportunity if searching for a new job.  The gap means that there is a known potential for 
either firms or workers to act opportunistically if they are not constrained by either legal 
rules or norms of good behavior.  Consequently, arbitrary and unfair employment 
practices by an employer can render a workplace exploitative.22     
 
There are two related critical differences between the union sector workplace and 
the nonunion, human resource management-based workplace.  The first and most obvious 
is that the nonunion sector employment relationship is typically guided by policies set by 
the firm using principles of hierarchy.  Although employee participation may be 
encouraged, there is no collective bargaining or meeting of the minds to form an 
agreement.  In most large firms, the policies follow principles of human resource 
management (hereinafter HR practices).23   
 
The second is that the human resource policies are norm-based and consequently 
privately enforcing rather than contractual or legally enforcing.  Even where an 
employment practice is explicitly set and communicated to the employees, an aggrieved 
employee does not have standing to seek a legal remedy.  The employee who has a 
substantive complaint can work through the procedures set by the firm.  Here again, even 
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if the employee believes her procedural rights have been violated on top of her 
substantive claim, she cannot sue the employee.   In its most well known formulation—
employment-at-will—it says that with respect to termination, an employer may discharge 
an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.24    
 
The rule, however, is not the practice.  In practice, employers discharge 
employees only for cause.  Consequently, employment-at-will is best understood as a 
“jurisdictional boundary,” that is, the courts will not intervene in the nonunion 
employment relationship  (Rock and Wachter, 1996).25   So what makes an employer 
adhere to the norm or good practice even when it can act arbitrarily?  One specific reason 
is that the firm loses more in reputational harm than it can gain by acting 
opportunistically.   
 
More generally, firms have found that maintaining a fair human resource policy 
pays off.  The employment relationship is composed of highly interactive, repetitive and 
connected transactions.  Dissatisfied employees have considerable ability to impose 
sanctions on firms that they believe are acting unfairly.  This can occur through quits, 
absenteeism, and work slowdowns when the employer is most vulnerable to such 
activities.  In the extreme cases, it can involve actual sabotage, This makes the 
employment relationship self-enforcing (Wachter and Wright, 1990).  
 
Human resource policies have developed over the past two decades to make 
norm-based employment relationships more sophisticated and dependable in their 
operation.  During the 1970s, when many of these practices were being adopted, a goal of 
the employer may have been to avoid becoming unionized.  With unionization rates as 
low as they are today, it is less likely that practices are being driven by developments in 
the union sector of the economy.    
 
Today, accepted HR practices reflect the now widely accepted view that the 
ability of firms to have a competitive advantage in their product market depends on their 
productive use of their human resources.   The result in many firms is a highly structured 
set of human resources policies that are intended to provide a workplace based on fair 
substantive policies and fair procedures.  This includes a mixture of external labor market 
comparisons as well as internal equity.  Policies deal with pay and benefits, promotion 
opportunities, layoffs and discharges, and work rules.  In addition, procedures provide 
details on how the substantive policies are developed and the rules that aggrieved 
individuals can follow.   In short, all aspects of the collective bargaining agreement in the 
union sector find their way into human resource policies.    
 
A major result of the HR practices is that there is less talk of exploitation today.  
For example, in the recent attempt by the UAW to unionize parts suppliers in the auto 
industry, there have been few claims of exploitative working conditions.  Instead, the 
main justification provided is that such steps are necessary to maintain existing union 
strength among the unionized United States incorporated automobile makers.   This is 
consistent with the rent-extraction story.26 
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 A regime of privately enforced employment rules and standards is obviously very 
inexpensive.  First, it saves on what can otherwise be high legal bills.  In the transaction-
intensive employment relationship, the number of interactions creates the potential for a 
large number of disputes.  In addition, and more importantly, private enforcement avoids 
errors by judicial or third party enforcers.  Any set of contracts or rules and standards are 
necessarily highly incomplete given the difficulty of having rules or standards to cover all 
future contingencies.  Consequently, the relevant rules and the facts of any dispute may 
be difficult or impossible for a third party to observe or verify. (Rock and Wachter, 1996) 
 
This is not to say HR policies work perfectly.  As in the union sector where the 
parties are occasionally forced to rely on their economic weapons or contract rights, 
parties in the nonunion sector are also occasionally forced to reply on their ability to 
sanction bad play.  In addition, not all opportunistic behavior is prevented by either the 
threat of the application of sanctions.  Individual employers can sometimes succeed as 
bad players.  The question is not whether individual episodes succeed, but rather whether 
the episodes become widespread.   
 
The softer private sanctions that workers can offer within the nonunion 
employment relationships are greatly strengthened by legal rules involving specific 
instances where opportunistic behavior by employers may succeed.  This is more likely 
where one-shot opportunistic gains exist that can result in one-time large redistributions 
or where information asymmetries exist and disclosure is difficult for employees to 
verify.  Public laws, for example ERISA and OSHA are primary examples of this 
phenomenon.   Bennett and Taylor (2002) make the argument that unions have been 
important contributors to the passage of this type of legislation and, to this extent are 
victims of their own successes.  There is a lot to be said for this position.  
 
Another factor working to deter opportunistic behavior in the application of HR 
practices is the threat of unionization.  Although this is of diminishing importance as 
union density decreases, it is still a real threat to employers that want to remain nonunion. 
 
The upshot is that through a combination of softer, self-enforcing sanctions and 
tougher, legally enforcing sanctions, the HR system in nonunion firms has developed into 
a system that has proved both malleable and successful when measured against any 
number of metrics.   On the one hand, as emphasized by Bennett and Taylor (2002) it can 
be strengthened by public legislation when the need arises.  On the other hand, as 
emphasized by Fiorito (2002), HR practices appear to increase workers’ job satisfaction. 
 
V. The Role of the Collective Bargaining Contract 
 
The union sector of the economy operates very differently from the nonunion 
sector.  Whereas the nonunion sector uses norms, or HR practices, that are privately 
enforced, the union sector relies on third-party enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreement.  As a consequence, the industrial relations, or IR, contracting system has high 
direct costs tied to its mechanism for writing and enforcing contracts.   First, the National 
Labor Relations Board provides an administrative law system for adjudicating statutory 
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rights.  Decisions from this body can be appealed to the federal appellate courts.  Second, 
the common law courts provide a mechanism for enforcing the contractual rights 
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement.  Finally, grievance machinery, 
including third-party arbitrators, is normally available to handle workplace disputes.   
 
Whereas the HR workplace is inexpensive to run, the IR workplace is expensive 
and the reasons are essentially the reverse of those mentioned above.  First, there are the 
direct costs inherent in a multi-layered system.  Second, there are the rigidities introduced 
by the contract mechanism in the context of a highly transactional intensive workplace 
environment.  Working conditions may need to be flexible and to evolve as unanticipated 
future states of the world occur.  By including contract terms that cover working 
conditions, the parties reduce the flexibility in the same and replace it with a binding 
grievance arbitration mechanism that can generate delay and impose rigidities that reduce 
efficiency (Rock and Wachter, 1996). 
 
If employers are exploitative, then the IR contracting system is better suited to 
protect employees than is the norm-based HR system.  Legally enforceable contracts 
work much better than privately enforcing norms when one or both of the parties is prone 
to opportunistic behavior.   If labor markets are monopsonistic, the IR system, by 
increasing wages, will increase employment as well as wages.  
 
The contractual system also works best, at least for employees, if the primary goal 
of the union is to achieve an employment package for its members that exceeds 
competitive levels—and which management would not be willing to grant absent the risk 
of a strike.   Norm-based, private enforcement only works well in a highly cooperative 
environment and this is unlikely if the parties’ contract is based on the threat of the use of 
economic weapons.   
 
Is there a public purpose in today’s collective bargaining apparatus or is the effect 
only one of redistribution in favor of union members?  During the great debate of the 
decades around the Great Depression, collective bargaining served many public purposes, 
including making labor markets function more effectively and serving as a countervailing 
force to otherwise unchecked corporate power.  Today, there are still public purposes, but 
they are less grand in their reach and aspirations.   
 
Perhaps the most notable public purpose is that unions encourage nonunion firms 
to adopt fair employment practices that lead workers to be content in a nonunion 
environment.  And what types of unions will best keep nonunion employers in line?  
Certainly a collective bargaining apparatus designed to redistribute income from profits 
to non-management employee wages will create a strong incentive effect for nonunion 
employers to eschew opportunistic policies.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In discussing the future of private sector unions and the likelihood of a resurgence 
in union membership one needs to evaluate the early period of union ascendancy (1930s 
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through the early 1950s) as well as the past few decades when unions have been in 
decline.  We know trends currently in place are unfavorable to unions.  What conditions 
would be favorable?  When the earlier period of union growth is studied, two factors 
become prominent—the competitiveness of the labor market and the ability of unions to 
fulfill their major goal of either extracting economic rents or remedying market failures 
that result in exploitative employment relationships.   
 
The rise of unions from the 1930s through the early 1950s was due to the 
convergence of a number of events—an economic policy that attempted to restrict 
competition beginning in the 1930s, the twin beliefs that labor markets were inherently 
noncompetitive and/or that individual workplaces were exploitative, and low union 
premiums.   The passage of highly favorable legislation, in the form of the Wagner Act, 
was a reflection of the idea that unions could actually improve the functioning of labor 
markets and serve as a countervailing power to big business.   
 
Over the past several decades, union density declined because government policy 
became pro-competitive, it became clearer that labor markets were relatively competitive, 
HR practices developed that reduced the amount of opportunistic behavior of employers, 
and unions increased the percentage premium they enjoyed in industries where rents were 
available.  In this environment, the public-good aspect of labor unions—their ability to 
improve the functioning of labor markets--was called into question.  The passage of 
amendments to the NLRA that were unfavorable to unions was a reflection of this 
changed sentiment as to the public good aspect of unions as well as to the adoption of 
pro-competitive market policies in general. 
 
Over the near-term, union density is likely to continue to decline for all of the 
reasons mentioned in the first section of this paper.  Attempts to forecast beyond the near-
term, however, cannot be reliably done because the critical institutional and policy factors 
that are central to today’s outcomes may change.  What I have attempted to do in this 
paper is to focus attention on the precise nature of the institutional and policy factors that 
matter.  For example, if employers were to become more opportunistic in their treatment 
of employees, union density might rise again.   The recent disclosures of corporate 
misconduct have not had this effect, at least to this point, perhaps because the violations 
have been of corporate rules and standards and the losers have been more shareholders 
han employees. 
 
The same would be true if government policy were to once again become anti-
competitive.  Examples would be renewed tariff protection, subsidies to industries 
suffering from competitive pressures, or re-regulation.  I do not believe that a severe 
recession, in itself, would have the same effect on union density as the Great Depression 
is thought to have had.   The stagflation of the 1970s, which caused a stagnation in real 
wages that paralleled the Great Depression (at least in terms of length), actually resulted 
in a decline in union density because the United States continued and indeed extended its 
commitment to pro-competitive policies across markets.  
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The one other factor that could have a major impact on union density is whether 
unions themselves adopt goals more in keeping with a competitive economy.   Unions 
today are lacking one of the major factors that benefited them during the early heady 
expansionary years.  During that period, unions were viewed as potentially correcting 
market imperfections, not adding to them.  But the Hicksian School won the debate.  
Hence, a new approach would be needed.   For example, unions could trade in their 
“monopoly face” for a more pronounced “voice face” or even a “competitive face.”27   
That is, they could seek to deliver an employment relationship that works more 
efficiently than nonunion employment relationships.  At least some movement in this 
direction could be easily done because the union premium remains historically very high.  
A greater change would involve substantially more risk, particularly if union members 
decided that their union was no longer increasing their wages and benefits by enough to 
cover their membership costs.  Policies that would have unions become more competitive 
are explored in Estreicher’s (2002) thoughtful and cleverly done paper and in Wachter 
(1995). 
 
But another approach is also possible: accept the status quo.  Although many 
academics and some union leaders believe that low union density is a major policy 
problem, it does not bulk large on most political radar screens.  In accepting the status 
quo, the union movement would abandon being a mass movement that would unionize 
much of the eligible workforce and instead would focus on pockets where economic rents 
can be redistributed (Estreicher 2002) or where exploitative firms are acting 
opportunistically.   In keeping with this change, unions would also become more of a 
political force advocating legislative policies favorable to workers (Bennett and Taylor 
2002).    
 
Accepting the status quo is hardly a radical position.  Union density in the private 
sector may be low today, but “low” by what standard?  As stressed above, the union 
movement succeeded in becoming a major force representing nearly half of the private 
sector workforce only briefly and only because of the unusual confluence of policies 
adopted during the Great Depression.  Imagine that instead of adopting a series of anti-
competitive policies during the 1930s, the government battled the economic downturn 
with pro-competitive policies.  In this scenario, labor legislation is adopted, but it is the 
legislation that existed by 1948, with the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA.  From 
this perspective the decline in union density should be judged against some historical 
average rather than a peak number.  Union success would not be measured against it 
becoming a mass movement, but rather in its ability to represent pockets of opportunity; 
that is, where wage premiums are possible or where exploitative nonunion employment 
relations exist.  In this case, the predicted union density would vary over time as 
government competition policies and the ability of employers to sustain enlightened HR 
policies changed over time.       
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1 Lipset and Katchanovski (2002).  
2 Thieblot (2002) at p. 149. 
3 See the introduction and conclusions of Bennett and Kaufman (2002), the papers by Bennett and Taylor 
(2002), Samuel Estreicher (2002), Bruce Kaufman (2002), and Lipset and Katchanovski (2002).  
4 Unions have certainly been successful in improving wages and other terms and conditions of employment 
above what would exist without collective bargaining, but the result has been job losses.  Taking “wages 
out of competition” presumes improving member welfare without suffering the consequences of job losses.  
5 For an earlier review of the evidence, see Hirsch and Addison (1986).   This section draws heavily on 
Bennett and Kaufman’s volume (2002). 
6 Troy (2002) stresses this point.   
7 Among the first papers to make this point is Linneman, Wachter, and Carter (1990).  See also Hirsch and 
Schumacher (2002). 
8 I argue below that the rise of industrial unions is a consequence of the anti-competitive industrial policy 
of the 1930s.  This created rents in the newly emerging industrial sector over which firms and the new 
unions could bargain.   
9 See, for example, the then current and now classic account of Robert A Brady (1943, pp. 252-53) a noted 
economist of the time and participant in New Deal policies.  Brady clearly identifies a primary policy goal 
of the 1930s to be “stabilizing business,” which was understood to mean restricting competition.  The same 
theme, identified as controlling “excessive competition” is stressed by Alan Brinkley (1995) in his more 
recent account of the New deal.  Brady’s work is honored in an essay by Douglas Dowd (1994).   The 
National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional in 1936.  Robinson-Patman was declared 
by its sponsors to be the Magna Carta of small businesses since it would protect them from competition 
from large, more competitive firms.  Miller-Tydings allowed manufacturers to specify a minimum retail 
price for their products in order to protect small retailers from the price competition of the chain store.  
(Bean 1996). 
10 The idea that the antitrust laws have been used to reduce competition is stressed by Bork (1978). 
11 Berle and Means (1939) extraordinarily influential text on the modern corporation states: “(T)he modern 
corporation may be regarded…as the dominant institution of the modern world. …(It) has brought a 
concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state. …The future 
may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, 
but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization." (pp 356-57). 
12 The idea that unions represent one of the most important countervailing powers to unbridled corporate 
power is made most strongly by Galbraith (1952) at pp. 121-123. 
13 This is not to say that union density would not have increased without these historical forces.  The claim 
is simply that the extent of the rise in union density was a function of the unique historical elements of the 
time.   What form labor legislation might have taken, absent the supervening event of the Great Depression, 
is too speculative for comment.  
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14 Real wages fell 6.9 percent between 1929 and 1933 and had recouped the loss by 1936.  Real wages fell 
4.7 percent between 1972 and 1981 and did not make up the loss in 1985.   
15 Hicks was 28 years old when he published The Theory of Wages (1932).  Since he was not well 
established until his influential Value and Capital, published in 1939, his ideas spread slowly.   
16 Hicks (1932) at 86. 
17 See Ehrenberg and Smith (2000) as concluding that labor markets are primarily competitive today.  
Contrast their discussion with that of Shove (1932), during the 1930s.   
18 Kaufman (2002) attempts to resuscitate Commons.   He is very successful in showing that modern 
economists can learn a great deal from reading Commons who had a great deal of knowledge of 
institutional forces at work in labor markets.    But Commons's theory of wages, although highly attractive 
was wrong and gave way to Hicks's  theory.        
19 See Ehrenberg and Smith (2000) for a detailed discussion of the issue.  
20 The paper was published in the 1955 presidential address to the Economics section of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science.  Although he applied his argument primarily to Great Britain, 
he thought it applicable to the United States as well.   
21 See, for example, Clark (1984), Hirsch (1991) and Hirsch and Connolly (1987). 
22 Slichter, Healy and Livernash, (1960) report that "[t]he origin of a union in many enterprises can be 
traced to a belief on the part of employees that the company had been arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
capricious in meting out discipline.  There have been foremen who acted like little czars in administering 
discipline and companies that imposed  the most extremely personal rules upon employees.  To a great 
extent the development of constructive personnel practices eliminated some of the abuses of 'autocratic 
discipline.'  But labor unions must be given much credit for initiating directly or indirectly less draconic 
systems of discipline" (p.624). 
23 I use the term human resource practices as it is applied in the standard texts on the subjects that are 
taught in business schools.  See, for example, Schuler and Jackson (1996) and Foot and Hook (1999). 
24 See Rock and Wachter (1996) for a discussion of human resource policies, and particularly employment-
at-will, as being norm based.   Norms are best defined as non-legally enforceable rules and standards  
(Rock and Wachter, 2001). 
25 There are obvious exceptions.  The courts will intervene to enforce legislative or administrative public 
policies.  Examples are equal pay provisions and occupational health and safety rulings.   
26 Reported in Business Week (Muller 2002). 
27 Using Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) highly appropriate metaphor. 
